


# Marine Corps Amphibious Doctrine

## The Gallipoli Connection

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In 1934, the U. S. Marine Corps published its first manual for landing operations. The officers who were the authors of this unique publication worked on committees to research and draft the text of what would be the Marine Corps' first published guidance on the conduct of amphibious operations. Although these were experienced officers with shipboard service as well as expeditionary duty, they had in common an absence of experience in large-scale opposed amphibious landings. Yet, in the 1930s, this was exactly the task the Marine Corps was preparing for as it defined its wartime mission of seizing advanced bases for the fleet. As in the well-known adage that we study the last war to learn to fight the next, so had Marine Corps officers looked to an historical precedent from which to form and evaluate conclusions regarding the best means of performing this unfamiliar task. Thus, a most unlikely union was made between early Marine Corps amphibious doctrine and a British campaign of World War I notorious for its failure - Gallipoli.

### GALLIPOLI




Map A. – Dardanelles & Approaches - 1915

<sup>1</sup> This essay was downloaded from the GlobalSecurity.org website in 2010 and edited by Charles Kamps, USAF Air Command & Staff College, to include new graphics.

Gallipoli is a rugged, largely barren peninsula, approximately 12 miles wide and 47 miles long. The peninsula's strategic value to the British in 1915 was its dominance of the Dardanelles Straits, part of a narrow waterway that linked the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. (Map A) The peninsula was largely uninhabited and was defended by a series of coastal forts and batteries on its southern edge overlooking the Dardanelles. (For a map of Turkish coastal defences and army dispositions see end of paper.)

Great Britain declared war on Turkey on October 31, 1914. In January of 1915, the British decided to engage in a naval campaign to force the Dardanelles, with the goals of diverting from the Caucasus Turkish troops that were pressing the Russians, and of giving the Russians access to the Mediterranean. Although British naval and army opinion of 1914 condemned an unsupported naval attack on forts and guns mounted ashore, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty recommended, and the War Cabinet approved, an ambitious plan to bombard Gallipoli and force the Dardanelles with a purely naval attack.


Optimistically anticipating that a forcing of the straits would take four weeks, a fleet of British and French ships began an attack on February 19, 1915. The final phase of this naval campaign ended on March 18th. Of the 16 ships which began the fight, three were sunk by mines, and three were badly disabled. Although some damage was done to forts and guns, overall, the Turkish defenses were materially stronger at the end of the engagement than at the beginning, and Turkish morale had been given a boost. (26:53) The British Fleet remained in the Aegean, and British officials had to face the prospect of dealing with what was not only a most humiliating and poorly timed loss of prestige, but one which could have a damaging effect on the outcome of the war.



Gallipoli Map 1: Naval Attack, 18 March 1915

During February, the British War Cabinet decided to assemble a military force in Egypt to support the attack, should it be needed. Sir Ian Hamilton commanded this expeditionary force, which consisted of the 29th Division from England, a French division, and the "Anzac Corps", composed of Australian and New Zealand divisions. Shortly following the failed attempt to force the straits, they decided to commit this force. Hamilton considered an immediate landing at Gallipoli with forces then at his disposal, which would have taken advantage of the elements of surprise and numerical superiority. He abandoned the idea for several reasons, to include the discovery that troop transports from England had embarked without consideration of their eventual tactical employment. The ships had been administratively, rather than combat loaded, and thus would need to be reloaded. The nearest suitable naval base was in Egypt, so Hamilton sailed to Alexandria to plan his campaign.

Hamilton believed the mission of the army was to assist the fleet in clearing passage through the Dardanelles. His objective, therefore, was to control the lower, or lesser end of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The subsequent plan involved a main attack by the 29<sup>th</sup> Division and a secondary one by the Anzac Corps. The missions of the 29th Division and Anzac Corps were to cut Turkish lines of communication and to capture the key terrain which dominated the lesser peninsula. Simultaneously, a diversionary landing was to be made by the French on the Asiatic side of the straits, and a naval demonstration and feint landing at the Gulf of Saros near the northern base of the peninsula. (Map B)



Map B – Initial landings

The Anzac Corps was the first to land on 25 April 1915. Its landing site was 13 miles north of the toe of the peninsula at Gaba Tepe. The first flotilla shoved off at approximately 0330 and landed one half mile north of its intended landing site. That error placed the Anzac Corps on a narrow beach which was backed by jutting cliffs. The Anzacs landed under the fire of Turkish artillery and machine guns. Subsequent waves were delayed by Turkish artillery and naval gunfire from a ship firing from across the peninsula, as well as the time-consuming use of Anzac troop transport craft to ferry wounded back to the ships. By nightfall, the exhausted Anzacs held a beachhead three fourths of a mile deep, and one and one-half miles wide. Their movement inland had been checked by the rugged, restrictive terrain, and by midnight the Anzac Corps commander recommended to Hamilton that the Anzacs be evacuated.




*Anzac Cove – 25 April 1915*

The main attack landings occurred on a series of beaches wrapping around the toe of the peninsula. The 29th Division landed at five separate beaches, designated "V", "W", "X", "Y", and "S". (Map, Tab B) Transports carried the men to the protection of warships assigned to cover the landings, and the men then transferred to landing craft. The principal landing craft used were steam-powered launches or trawlers, which pulled a string of cutters or other small craft. Each string of craft was collectively referred to as a tow. The tows were slow, offered no protection from fire, and were not themselves fitted with guns.

The landings at some beaches were accomplished at dawn, while at other sites landings were made in broad daylight. Enemy resistance ran the gamut from nonexistent to fierce, and naval gunfire was employed with varying degrees of success to support the landings. At "W"

Beach, heavily-laden men had waded ashore, encountering underwater barbed wire entanglements and buried torpedo heads, while the Turks fired from almost point blank range. Battalions landing at "Y" Beach had encountered no resistance but remained in the beachhead area throughout the day; they were detected, and a Turkish force assembled and counterattacked them at night. The British force successfully resisted the attacks, yet on the morning of the 26th they withdrew from "Y" Beach and returned to their ships.



The landing at "V" Beach is a remarkable story unto itself. At approximately 0640, following over an hour-long bombardment by naval gunfire, a covering force of 700 men in tows had met with such heavy fire that the few unwounded men who made it ashore were pinned to the beach, protected only by a low escarpment. The second wave of 2,500 men was conveyed aboard a converted collier, the River Clyde. The iron-sided River Clyde, fitted with two machine guns on her bow, had eight ports through which troops could disembark. The ship grounded further from shore than expected, so lighters were aligned to form a bridge to the beach. As the first three companies of men crossed this makeshift bridge, it twice drifted into deep water, isolating the unprotected men. Of the men who were not shot, many were drowned attempting to swim to shore while weighted down by their ammunition and equipment. Of the first 1,000 men who had left the River Clyde, almost half were killed or wounded before reaching the beach. The men remaining on the River Clyde went ashore at night, and surprisingly, were not fired upon while landing.



*The River Clyde at "V" Beach*

The preceding paragraphs provide only a brief account of the initial landings involved in a very complex campaign. General Hamilton's forces remained on Gallipoli for an additional eight months, were reinforced, and mounted a major, but indecisive offensive in August. The men suffered horribly - the summer plague of heat, dysentery, and flies was aggravated by a chronic lack of water in some areas. Winter found the men unprepared for the cold, ill-supplied, and still unable to break the now all-too-familiar stalemate of trench warfare. On October 15th, Hamilton was relieved, and by January 9th, 1916 the new commander had completed a well-planned, successful withdrawal of all Allied forces.

Whether viewed from a political or strategic perspective, or as an infantry, naval, or amphibious operation, Gallipoli was a critic's smorgasbord, offering everything from peaches to pickled herring. Politicians, military writers, and historians have all had their say in either condemning, supporting, or laying blame for what had taken place. The debate has continued into the last decade of the 20th Century.

Hamilton, in his diary, made frequent references to the myriad considerations he and his staff had pondered in planning the landings at Gallipoli. Chief among them were the need for tactical surprise, a sufficient number of landing craft (preferably ones with iron sides to offer protection from gunfire), adequate ammunition and equipment, and accurate, continuing intelligence regarding the Turkish dispositions on the peninsula. Despite this, the amphibious

assaults of April 25th were later viewed by many critics as having been executed in almost total disregard of Hamilton's own analysis of what the situation demanded. Other writers, in critiquing both the amphibious and land campaigns, looked beyond military decisions and activities, and would lay blame for the disastrous results at the feet of the British Government for having treated Gallipoli as a mere sideshow to the western front. As a result of the government's attitude, resources had not been objectively allocated, resulting oftentimes in crippling shortages of essential supplies, particularly ammunition.

Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell, Director of Military Operations at the British War Office, viewed Gallipoli from another perspective. In 1919 he would write of the fated campaign, "The Dardanelles operations were indeed charged throughout with instruction for the thinker on the methods of war." (17:346) Callwell provided many forward-looking conclusions regarding amphibious landings in his book, *Campaigns and Their Lessons*. On opposed landings he would write,

There are many localities which from the topographical point of view favour disembarkation and which the enemy will in consequence presumably feel obliged to guard, it may always be worthwhile to reject them all and to try instead at some point which is not in itself by any means attractive as a landing-place.... what a desperate venture a landing in defiance of determined resistance is under the tactical conditions of to-day. That class of undertaking is one to be avoided at almost any cost. (17:65)

Callwell pronounced the effect of naval gunfire "disappointing", yet not one which should have surprised experienced officers. He concluded that although "fire should be maintained up till the very last moment, so that the defenders dare not show their heads" warships did not have the proper type of ordnance to destroy earthworks and provide cover for landing forces. He added that even with the proper ordnance, it could not have been used effectively from a moving platform. (17:74, 75) On the employment of supporting artillery and naval gunfire, Callwell noted that there had been "ample discussion as to the virtues of cooperation between guns and infantry", but that "the practical methods of arriving at the desired end had not been grappled with." (17:340) He recommended sending observation parties ashore to act as forward observers for naval gunfire. To overcome the problem of inaccuracy in indirect artillery fire when observers could not communicate with batteries, he stated that the only means of "obtaining edifying results are to be found in aerial observation, if that be practicable." (17:340) With regard to the future role of aircraft, he offered this conservative assessment: "Aeronautics introduce new factors into operations of war, and there is reason to suppose that they will in the future exert considerable influence over amphibious contests." (17:341, 342)

Callwell felt the use of the River Clyde demonstrated the advisability of using large, specially-fitted landing craft. The many casualties which occurred during the daylight opposed landing at "W" Beach led him to conclude that "running a ship full of soldiers ashore may prove to be an excellent way of effecting a landing if the entire operation be carried out at night. There are, however, obvious nautical objections to adopting such a procedure." (17: 83, 84) Sir Julian Corbett, in his account of the naval operations at Gallipoli, would note that the navigational

problems encountered in landing the Anzac Corps supported the wisdom of the naval decision not to attempt the main landings of the 29th Division in the dark. (19:v.2, 321, 322)

Callwell noted that Gallipoli demonstrated the importance of speed in opposed landings. He stressed the importance of planning "with a view to getting a maximum number of troops ashore at the start in a minimum period of time." (17:101)

The consensus among other writers was that the British forces at Gallipoli could have successfully engaged in the large-scale amphibious operations required by the situation, and could have accomplished opposed landings with acceptable casualty rates, had there been realistic, detailed planning at all levels and the allocation of suitable, and sufficient, resources from beginning to end. The near-ideal conditions described by these writers as prerequisites for successful amphibious operations could not have been created in April of 1915, however, if for no other reason than the expedition's complete absence of operational and tactical surprise. The need for effective naval gunfire to cover the landing forces and destroy obstacles, for swift landing craft which offered men protection from fire, for craft sizable enough for the assault to benefit from the quick massing of landing forces, and for the means to readily bring ashore portable artillery, equipment, and huge quantities of consumable supplies, was not within the technological, industrial, or logistical capabilities of the British or their allies. The formula for success described by so many had yet to make it beyond the laboratory.

## **CHANGES TO THE MARINE CORPS' MISSION AND ORGANIZATION**

The British experiences in the Gallipoli campaign have had a significant, and lasting, impact on Marine Corps amphibious doctrine. The agency which would form a link in the 1930s between the events and lessons learned at Gallipoli and Marine Corps amphibious doctrine, which as of yet was undeveloped, was the Marine Corps Schools at Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia. The impetus to develop, teach, and give form to Marine Corps' amphibious doctrine was twofold: the newly-formalized role of the Marine Corps, and an awareness of the type of warfare which would arise in the Pacific if the U. S. went to war with Japan.

The Marine Corps' role in preparing for the amphibious as well as defensive operations in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases evolved gradually throughout the early 1900s. In 1900, the Marine Corps had first been given the formal mission of seizing advanced bases by the Navy's General Board. However, for the next three decades the Corps suffered from manpower shortages which were aggravated by the oftentimes conflicting missions of providing ship's detachments, guarding overseas permanent naval facilities, and the assignment of forces to the Philippines, Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and China. Because of the Marine Corps' experience in these "small wars", Congress, the Navy Department, and some Marine officers had come to view military intervention as the Corps' primary mission. (25:261) This, and a chronic shortage of equipment, detracted from the establishment of a permanent advanced base force, trained and ready for deployment with the fleet. (20:121-123)

In testimony before the House Naval Committee on March 1st, 1920, Commandant Major General John A. Lejeune set forth his views on the principal wartime mission and roles of the Marine Corps. Lejeune stated that the Marine Corps would supply expeditionary forces for

service with the fleet, which would be responsible for the seizure, occupation, fortification, and defense of advance naval bases. He emphasized that preparedness for amphibious war was of primary concern to the Corps, and could be accomplished by the proper peacetime equipping, training and maintenance of its expeditionary force. (24:1, 2) At this time, these forces were not a permanent, institutionalized component of the fleet, nor were they under the operational control of a fleet commander.

In order to correct or eliminate disharmony among the services regarding their respective wartime missions, the War Department and the Navy Department formulated a policy to govern joint operations. Issued in 1927 by the Joint Board of the Army and Navy, the directive was entitled *Army - Navy Joint Action*, and it stated that the Marine Corps would be given responsibility for the seizure of advanced naval bases, and special training in the conduct of landing operations. By 1929, the special role of the Marine Corps, recognized by both the Army and the Navy, was to provide a small, well-trained amphibious assault force to seize and occupy overseas bases for fleet operations. (23:28)

The identification and eventual formalization of this role during the 1920's did not lead toward the quick resolution of the many problems already known to be involved in even unopposed amphibious operations. During that decade, officers at the Marine Corps Schools received instruction based upon Army organization and doctrine. It was not until 1926 that the school gradually incorporated subjects related to landing operations. In addition to classes on Army infantry operations and a new overseas expeditionary course, officers during the 1926-1927 academic year studied animal management, equitation, and pack transportation. This instruction reflected the state of technological development, the non-availability of mechanical transport, and the Corps' experience in "small wars". Not until the 1930s would there be a major shift to a maritime orientation. (16:16, 17) So, along with problems as practical as those of unsuitable and inadequate landing craft, the Marine Corps entered the 1930s improperly trained, organized, and equipped to support the complex, offensive, and specialized requirements of amphibious assaults.

Major General John H. Russell, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, studied a concept for the creation of an organization to better support the Marine Corps' mission with the fleet. Russell recognized that a body of Marines would have to be permanently attached to the fleet; otherwise, training in advanced base work would be continually interrupted by the detachment of units for other purposes. In 1933 he recommended to the Commandant that the old "Expeditionary Force" be discontinued, and that a new body be formed. Called the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), it was organized to be a quickly-mobilized striking force for tactical employment by the U. S. Fleet. The FMF concept was accepted by the Commandant and the Navy Department and was formally established in December of 1933. (23:33, 34) The creation of the FMF was a major step in the Marine Corps' commitment to its wartime mission. With it had evolved a change in the nature and emphasis of the formal instruction being provided at the Marine Corps Schools, where the courses of instruction began to stress the seizure of advanced naval bases, rather than the defense of such facilities. (16:24) An equally important step, following on the heels of this change in training, was the preparation of a manual for landing operations to document the concepts and techniques needed to govern this now "specialized", largely unfamiliar way of waging war.



*USMC Landing exercise*

## **RETURN TO GALLIPOLI**

In the above (Gallipoli) campaign, we have at our disposal the results of actual experience in the planning and conduct of overseas operations; experience that can become our own through the medium of study. (11:15)

It is ironic that the Gallipoli Campaign, considered by so many to have been a costly political, strategic and operational debacle, should serve as a case study for officers at Quantico, yet the 20th century had little else to offer. In World War I, American troops, to include Marines, had debarked at friendly ports and had traveled to the front by rail and road with relative ease. (23: v) Marines serving on expeditionary duty had landed in Nicaragua, Mexico, and Haiti, but large-scale, opposed landings were, by American experience, in the realm of the unknown. The Corps' participation in fleet exercises at Culebra, a small island near Puerto Rico, had taught the Marines many practical lessons regarding weapons, landing craft, and combat loading of vessels, ground transportation, and the value of aircraft. These exercises now provided an added impetus for greater effort to solve the problems involved in amphibious operations, as they reinforced the fact that neither the Navy nor Marine Corps were prepared to successfully carry out these demanding operations.

Recognition of Gallipoli's uniqueness, as well as its relevance, was expressed in 1922 by Commander L. W. Townsend, U.S. Navy, during a lecture delivered to students at the Marine

Corps Schools when he stated that "it is the only combined or amphibious operation of that war which corresponds in any degree to the conduct of an overseas campaign which our own country might someday be obliged to conduct against a distant enemy." (11:1) This same rationale for the study of Gallipoli constantly appears in both the lectures and literature presented to, and prepared by, officers at the school in the 1920s and 1930s.

The formal study of Gallipoli at the Marine Corps Schools, and the importance the Corps placed on the familiarity of officers with the campaign, is evidenced by the curriculum of 1932-1933. Instruction Memorandum Number 10, issued by the Marine Corps Schools, directed that the officers attending the Field Officers Course participate in a month-long study of Gallipoli. This study formed an important part of the background in research on the subject of landing operations at the school. (18:99) The course consisted of a series of five lectures delivered by members of the school staff, and research work performed by student committees. Worthy of special note was the school's rationale in assigning students their research: "The purpose of assigning work to student committees is to acquaint the students with the Gallipoli Campaign:

To train them in military research; and to provide the Schools and through them the Marine Corps with material of value on a campaign which is in many respects of the type we are expected to be experts in." (4:2) The school decided that only those features which differentiated Gallipoli from purely land campaigns would be studied by members of the class. (10: 1)

Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Sturdevant, who had been tasked to prepare and conduct the Gallipoli Course, delivered lectures on the events leading up to the campaign, General Hamilton's plans of attack in April and August of 1915, the Turkish plan of defense, and a final lecture on command and leadership at Gallipoli. At the request of officers who had attended the previous year's Gallipoli Course, an additional presentation on air operations was added in 1933. Navy Officers gave classes on naval activities and medical care. The majority of the student's time was spent researching and preparing one of the six committee reports on Gallipoli for formal presentation to the school staff and student body. Upon completion of the course, Lieutenant Colonel Sturdevant, in a letter to the Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, voiced the opinion that the Gallipoli Campaign should be studied every year by the Field Officer's Class as well as by the Company Officer's Class. (10:2)

The guidance given by the school to students for their study of Gallipoli, and the content of the reports they prepared clearly indicates that these Gallipoli studies were not a critique of British strategy or tactics; rather, the focus was of another nature - if such an operation had to be undertaken, what must be done to make it successful. The Marine Corps' wartime mission now required preparedness for the amphibious phases of seizing advanced bases for the Navy, by assault if necessary. The future requirement for American forces to engage in such operations in the Pacific, should the war with Japan come, was considered inevitable. As Colonel E. B. Miller, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools would write in September of 1932, regarding the Marine Corps need to get on with the process of preparing for amphibious operations,

"WE MUST KNOW; THE NAVY MUST KNOW; and THE NAVY MUST KNOW THAT THE MARINE CORPS KNOWS." (6:1)

The most recent, and comprehensive publication on amphibious operations available to the Marine Corps in early 1933 was the *Joint Overseas Expedition Manual*, 1933, a 43-page publication from the Joint Army-Navy Board. The manual's purpose was "to present a set of general principles for the planning and conduct of joint overseas expeditions in order to insure the most effective cooperation and coordination between Army and Navy forces. . ." (12:1) Although the pamphlet dealt with joint operations and was not oriented toward the offensive phase of amphibious operations, it did provide general guidelines for the division of responsibilities between the Navy and landing forces, it identified areas which required close coordination and the preparation of service and joint plans, and it provided a base of common terminology.

The pamphlet also illustrated the novelty of amphibious operations, and the inexperience of U. S. naval and ground forces in their conduct. The portion devoted to training would hardly have inspired confidence in the readiness of America's armed forces to face the threat of the Japanese, as it read:

**Joint Training.** The difficulties of landing on a hostile shore from small boats, heavily encumbered troops, most of whom have had little or no experience with the sea, and the unfamiliarity of the Navy with attack of land objectives, and with firing over friendly troops, make it necessary that as much preliminary joint training be carried out as time permits. (12:13)

If ever there was an understatement, or a more appropriately-timed illustration of the Marine Corps need to study, in detail, the unique requirements of amphibious operations, it had yet to surface. The Marine Corps recognized that it was without the amphibious doctrine to support training, and to guide the development of techniques to implement it.

The Gallipoli Studies of 1933 were the result of the combined effort of students from the rank of lieutenant through major. The report of *Committee I, Naval Activities*, emphasized the need for nearby advanced bases, properly prepared with ship's maintenance, supply, and hospital facilities to support naval and amphibious operations. The combat loading of vessels, focused upon a landing force's tactical employment upon debarkation, was covered in detail, as was the need to deploy in a manner that would minimize fatigue and stress on combat troops. Landing forces at Gallipoli often had little or no sleep for two nights and had been cramped into small craft for over two hours prior to their landing, oftentimes not knowing their destination or mission. This condition strained morale to the breaking point, and led the committee to conclude, "In future operations of this nature our navy must provide a plan that will eliminate such conditions and insure reasonably rapid, as well as sure, transportation." (3: Rpt. I, 13)

*Committee I* also identified the need for a method of navigation to support night landings, stating that the landings at "V" and "W" beaches proved that a daylight attempt against beaches known to be well-prepared for defense was apt to end in failure. The committee concluded that night landings could be conducted simultaneously if the Navy had control of sea

approaches to the shoreline; had ample time to perform reconnaissance on landing sites; had the support of navigational aids; and, had effective naval gunfire support. (3: Rpt I, 22, 23)

*Committee II* prepared a report entitled *Landings and Turkish Defense*. Its conclusions included the following: that mobile land artillery must be available to augment naval gunfire support; that diversions were valuable, but must be realistic to be effective; that the proper care and evacuation of casualties must be arranged; and that commanders must avoid underestimating the fighting qualities of the enemy. (3: Rpt II, 35)

*Signal Communications*, the report prepared by *Committee III*, identified the need for redundancy in communications, and commented on the lack of picket boats available at Gallipoli to carry urgent messages when other means failed. To help overcome command and control problems, the committee recommended the use of a ship equipped with wireless and visual signal equipment to serve as the temporary headquarters of a landing force commander. This ship's primary mission would be to support the commander, rather than that of providing naval gunfire support. Also recommended was the establishment of beach communications stations, with trained, responsible individuals in charge. *Committee III* concluded that

"...the spotting of ships' gun fire, and the communication of corrections to the firing ship, should have been in charge of a Naval Spotting and communications group, put ashore from the supporting ship with the first or second wave." (3: Rpt. III, 24)

The committee also considered the problem of liaison between commanders while on the offensive and referred to recommendations made in 1923 by a regimental officer with the Lancashire Fusiliers who served at Gallipoli. He had suggested the designation of prearranged, progressively located coordination points for use by commanders to establish liaison and receive and send messages laterally and to superior and subordinate commanders. *Committee III* concurred in the conclusion that such a system would result in greater cohesion and, after dark, greater confidence. (3: Rpt. III, 22)



*Beetle Boat – early landing craft*

The report of *Committee IV, Naval Gun Fire*, is unfortunately not available for review, but other reports and lectures of the time make reference to an article written by Navy Lieutenant Walter C. Ansel in 1932, *Naval Gunfire in Support of Landings – Lessons from Gallipoli*. Ansel concluded that armored ships, which would give guns a self-propelled platform, protect the crew, and keep an ammunition supply close at hand were necessary to provide the close-in support needed to protect troops in opposed landings. (14:1008)

*Committee V, Intelligence*, emphasized the need for adequate reconnaissance, particularly by air; for adequate communication facilities for passing that intelligence; and, for accurate as well as current intelligence to reach the right person if it was to be of any value. The committee also provided this recommendation, which has stood the test of time:

Landing Operations require a higher percentage of officers, due to casualties, than most other operations. All officers should be fully acquainted with the orders of at least their next higher commanding officer in order to be able to perform their commanding officer's tasks if necessary. (3:Rpt. V, 34)

*Services of Supply*, prepared by *Committee VI*, was a lengthy report which identified in detail the many supply and transportation problems encountered at Gallipoli, and it provided an analysis of the sources of the problems. The committee's careful review revealed many logistical issues which could become problems of nightmarish proportions if disregarded. The report emphasized the importance of detailed, advance planning, of cooperation between units supplying the operation, and of the need for continuous contact between officers in tactical command and their logistical staffs. (8:7) The report concluded that:

"All combined operations of Navy and Marine Corps should be committed to prior study, planning and preparation and as opportunity offers subjected to the acid test of practicability by utilization in maneuvers and operations" (3: Rpt. VI, 19)

Here, obviously, was a complex issue that was indeed in need of closer scrutiny by the Navy and Marine Corps.

The quality and timelessness of many of the conclusions developed by students and school faculty in their study of Gallipoli were discussed in a report prepared by Mr. W. H. Russell, Professor of Naval and Military History at the U S. Naval Academy. In 1951, he conducted a two-month study which had as an objective the identification of material bearing on the development of amphibious doctrine. (27) He prepared a 17-page compendium of the material which influenced the pre-1935 development of doctrine. Over half of this compendium consisted of material which dealt with Gallipoli. It included summaries of the school's formal lectures on the campaign and the student committee reports on Gallipoli. He referred to the students' conclusions as surprisingly modern and correct; this was a significant analysis considering those conclusions had been put to the test in World War II. Russell also referred to Lieutenant Colonel Sturdevant's 1933 presentation on command and leadership at Gallipoli as being, "Particularly strong in its commentary on command doctrine, and the aggressive command required by the amphibious operation." (8:Encl. B, 4)

Sturdevant was indeed strong in his criticism of the command and leadership problems found at Gallipoli, and he presented this somewhat dramatic expression of his views:

Did we still believe in magic and witchcraft, it would be easy to think that some evil genius had thrown a spell over Hamilton's force, so that whenever the enemy made a misstep, a British officer counter balanced it with a worse one; whenever the door to victory was open, a strange paralysis seized upon the wills of the British leaders and prevented them from marching through. (9:19)

Sturdevant's lecture stressed the importance of unity of command, stating that although Gallipoli was not a solitary example of divided control, it stood out because the results were so disastrous. When to move the command and control of a landing force ashore, particularly when hampered by a lack of communications, was also an issue presented to students for consideration. As an example of this problem, Sturdevant described the situation which arose during the landings of the covering forces at "V", "W", and "X" Beaches. The commander of the covering forces landed with the first wave at "W" Beach, out of sight and communication with the other two beaches. When he was subsequently wounded, the command technically shifted to an officer at "X" Beach who was never aware that he had been in command until he himself was wounded and evacuated. (9:4, 5) Of the need to balance the thoroughness, accuracy, and timeliness of orders issued to subordinates with the need to maintain secrecy, Sturdevant concluded, "The moral to be drawn may perhaps be phrased thus: In landing operations, as elsewhere, it is more important that your own forces understand your plans than that the enemy be kept in ignorance of them." (9:9)

## CONCLUSION

The development of the Corps' amphibious doctrine took its next significant step in late 1933. Classes at the Marine Corps Schools were suspended and students and staff merged to form into committees to study landing operations and prepare a doctrinal manual on landing operations. (16: 22) The *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* (TMLO) was published by the Marine Corps Schools in 1934 for use within the Marine Corps. This manual served as the basis for later editions which were distributed throughout the Navy as well as outside agencies.

There are many experiences, events, and people which have shaped the Marine Corps' amphibious doctrine. Conflicts of the last half-century have provided a wealth of valuable lessons; when coupled with the dramatic technological changes of the same period, their profound effect on the doctrine, techniques, and equipment of the Marine Corps are obvious. It was through the study and research performed at the Marine Corps Schools in the early 1930s, however, that the Corps developed many of the basic principles which form the doctrinal framework for today's amphibious operations. Gallipoli had served as the basis for research on amphibious landings at the school in 1932 and 1933. As described by Brigadier General Edwin Simmons in his history of the Marine Corps, "less colorful Marines were analyzing the mistakes of Gallipoli and identifying the bare bones of a viable amphibious doctrine." (28:126)



*Experimental Amphibian Tractor - 1924*

The emphasis the Marine Corps placed on the study of this unfortunate campaign, as well as its relevance to the operations for which the Marine Corps was preparing in the 1930s, undoubtedly left their mark on the minds of many officers. The ideas, conclusions, and techniques these officers developed as they prepared the TMLO, its subsequent editions, and as the Corps' continued the task of developing the landing craft, weapons, and equipment needed for amphibious operations were influenced by many factors. Significant among them was the opportunity Gallipoli provided to learn from the mistakes and misfortune of the British.

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
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
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*Turkish coastal defences*



*Turkish Army dispositions - Gallipoli*